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This paper attempts to relate empirical information on the 
growth of the number of welfare recipients and the quality 
of social transfers in West Germany to some more general 
theoretical discussions about the impact of the welfare 
state on changing patterns of social stratification and 
group formation.
Part I gives an overview of the sociological literature on 
cleavages which the welfare state may generate. Its focus 
is on the question to which extent conflicts between acqui­
sition classes are likely to be complemented or superseded 
by clashes between interest groups based on inequalities in 
the system of public transfers.
Part II describes the growing weight of persons relying on 
social transfers as their main source of income in the social 
structure and in the electorate. Then it depicts the growing 
burden of taxation for the economically active population. 
Finally, it describes the social positions within the wel­
fare class by showing the size of the client groups of 
various programmes and the differences in the generosity of 
benefits.
Part III discusses this information in the light of the 
general theories on changing modes of interest aggregation. 
Specific properties of the German welfare state seem to 
make a dominant role of welfare classes for the structuration 
of social conflicts unlikely. These properties are elaborated 
to formulate more general hypotheses about settings of social 
policy which tend to impede interest group formations based 
on welfare classes.
CONTENTS+ )
I Theoretical perspectives: The welfare state as basis for 
a new structuration of societal cleavages?
II Empirical evidence on transfer classes in West German society
A The changing relationship between welfare recipients and 
economically active categories
B The internal differentiation of the welfare clientele
1. Social positions in the welfare class I: Who the welfare 
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2. Social positions in the welfare class II: What welfare 
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The anpirical material for this paper was compiled as part of the 
research project "The Western European Welfare States Since the Second 
World War" which is directed by Peter Flora and financed by the Euro­
pean Carmunities. No table or graph contained in the paper may be 























































































































































































I Theoretical perspectives: The welfare state as basis for 
a new structuration of societal cleavages?
Throughout the post-war decades the Western democracies 
experienced an enormous increase of social activities of the 
state. The average share of public expenditure for social 
security in GDP more than doubled in Western Europe from 
9 % in 1950 to 22 % in 1977.  ̂ Some countries such as Sweden 
(30.5 %) even spent close to one third of the national resources 
for social purposes. Even in the nation with the most restrictive 
state supply of social services -Switzerland- the social security 
programmes claimed 16 % of the gross domestic product. Together 
with the capitalist organization of the economy and the demo­
cratic political order the welfare state today appears as one 
of the central structural characteristics of Western European 
societies.
The steep growth of the state supply of social transfers, goods 
and services could not remain without effects on the transformation 
of social structures. The disposable income and life chances 
of the population are no longer a mere function of positions 
in the market sphere, but are increasingly determined by 
transfers and grants provided by the administrative apparatus 
of the state. In 1975 public transfers in the Federal Republic 
of Germany on average accounted for 27 % of the total disposable 
income of private households (cf Krupp/Glatzer 1978). In this 
context it is hardly surptLsing that liberal as well as marxist 
scholars have been discussing to what extent the growing weight 
of state supplied income has rendered the traditional class 
analysis of modern capitalist societies obsolete (cf Offe 1972, 
Janowitz 1976, in more general terms also Giddens 1973).
For an extended period there seemed to be consensus that the 
public transfer systems helped to keep class conflict latent, 
promote social integration and secure political legitimacy.
In the political sphere -it was argued- the social security 
programmes filled the democratic idea of equal citizen rights with 
substantive meaning by complementing the more formal legal 
and political elements of citizenship with an effective material 
basis (cf Parsons 1960, Marshall 1964). In the economic sphere 
the transfer systems helped to reduce the social distance between 
wage earners and property holders by establishing legal entitle­




























































































compensate for the lack of property or favourable market incomes.
In combination with the institutional isolation of industry 
through the heavy reduction of working hours, the institutiona­
lization of collective bargaining, and the proliferation of 
non-occupational channels for mobility the social transfers thus 
reduced the relevance of economic inequalities and helped to 
reconcile the economically underprivileged groups with the 
prevailing mode of production (cf Dahrendorf 1959, Lipset 1964).
In recent years this optimistic assessment of the integrative 
effects of the welfare state has given way to a much more 
sceptical perspective. Marxist and liberal authors alike have 
argued that public welfare activities attain social integration 
only at the price of enhanced tensions at the level of system 
integration. They maintain that the welfare state - while contri­
buting to the social control and integration of the working class - 
increasingly undermines the self-regulating functioning of the 
capitalist economy. Whereas economic crises were traditionally 
overcome because the sinking costs of labour eventually re-stimu­
lated investment, today the collective bargaining process and 
the public transfer systems set tight limits to the potential of 
wage reductions. At the same time the transfer payments increase 
the cost of labour, inciting employers to labour-saving rationali­
zation measures which exacerbate unemployment. Increasing unemploy­
ment not only enhances the demand for transfers, but also lowers 
the public revenues, thus obliging the state to rely more heavily 
on deficit spending. This contributes to rising interest rates 
which in turn inhibit private investment and promote the shifting 
of private capital from the productive to the financial sector.
As a consequence the demand for public investments rises, but 
their realization in turn exacerbates the fiscal crisis of the 
state and increases its dependence on a smooth functioning of the 
economy. In a changing world macro-constellation with a stagnant 
world economy, rising international tensions , and higher burdens 
of military expenditure, chronic public deficits, declining real 
incomes and problems of government overload become likely prospects 





























































































In this new intellectual climate even the positive functions 
of the welfare state for social integration have been put into 
question. Several authors have drawn attention to the destructive 
effects which social activities of the state exert on intermediary- 
groups by shifting social responsibilities from small networks 
to public bureaucracies. In this perspective the institutionali­
zation of individual entitlements and the professionalization of 
the "social business" have transformed former producers of welfare 
into passive clienteles who increasingly lose the potential for 
active self-help. The double process of growing state intervention 
and weakened associational activities widens the gap between 
political elites and passive state clienteles, thus increasing the 
danger of an eventual substitution of self-regulating forms of 
social control by authoritarian forms of political control 
(cf Badura/Gross 1976, Baier 1976, Janowitz 1976).
Some sociologists have attempted to put hypotheses on the social 
impact of the welfare state into the wider context of a theoretical 
analysis of changing societal cleavage structures. In Germany 
Claus Offe (1972) and various collaborators (Bergmann et al. 1969) 
have argued that vertical inequalities between social classes 
lose relevance as a structural basis for social conflicts, because 
they are increasingly complemented by new "horizontal" inequalities 
which are rooted in the political process of "late capitalist" 
societies. The new cleavage lines are related to the unequal 
distribution of chances to influence the political decision making 
process (input side of the political system) and to systematic 
biases in the production of public goods (output side of the system).
On the input side the articulation of social needs is suppressed 
because the increasing fusion of market and transfer incomes has 
contributed to transform the once class-based parties into broad catch-all 
parties which avoid the expression of conflicts.The structure 
of interest group politics prevents the articulation and represen­
tation of the demands of groups with little organization potential 
or limited effective bargaining power. On the output side, three 
basic "system problems" - economic stability, military security, 
preservation of mass loyalty - have political priority so that the 
needs of groups with only little relevance to the preservation 
of the existing system of authority (due to little representative 
power - invalids, housewives, schoolchildren etc.) tend to remain 




























































































another gives way to the dominance of a few functional areas, 
and the pauperism of the proletariat is replaced by the modern 
misery of depressed areas.
According to the authors these new "horizontal disparities" 
provide only a weak basis for the organization of conflict groups, 
however, because they are not systematically related to socially 
structured positions, but to specific situations which affect all 
persons similarly. Thus, a person may draw a high income in the 
work sphere, but find himself in overcrowded systems of public 
transportation after work, lack educational facilities for his 
children, or suffer from the poor quality of the public health 
system in case of illness. Only the low income groups experience 
a socially structured cumulative effect of old and new forms of 
deprivation. The transformation of the new inequalities into 
open social conflicts is therefore "structurally underdetermined". 
To a large extent it depends on voluntary definitions by active 
spokesmen of the "situation groups". The professional elites who 
work in the deprived functional realms are the most likely candi­
dates to serve as agents for the manifestation of these otherwise
2latent tensions.
The American sociologist Harold Wilensky (1975, 1976, 1981) relates 
the growth of the welfare state more specifically to the emergence 
of new social clevage structures. In his perspective the welfare 
state was expanded during an unprecedented period of economic 
growth in the post-war decades. Rising incomes led to increases 
in state revenues which allowed to expand public services without 
resistance. Once the period of economic growth came to an end, the 
immense costs of the expanded state schemes met increasing 
uneasiness among tax payers who never since the First World War 
had been exposed to similarly fast increases of the tax
burden.
According to Wilensky tax rebellions and "welfare backlash" are 
not merely a function of the increasing burden of taxation, however 
but also of social and cultural changes during the period of affluence. The 
extended period of prosperity has led to an upgrading of standards 
of living which blurred the dividing lines between the working clas 
and the middle class, creating a new "middle mass"^ whose members 
have turnt loose from traditional political loyalties and become 




























































































the long experience of social mobility and occupational opportunity 
they strongly adhere to the success ideology and are unwilling to 
pay for those who fall behind. Whenever they perceive the financing 
or distribution of social transfers and services as inequitable 
they become the sounding-board of anti-welfare state ideologies.
In this perspective the growth of the welfare state beyond a certain 
threshold leads to a new societal cleavage between the economically 
active middle mass who has to foot the bill for the increasing state 
expenditure and the growing numbers of welfare clients who draw 
benefits. Indications of this new conflict may be seen in taxpayer 
revolts and the establishment of anti-tax parties, in political 
campaigns to tighten the eligibility requirements for the receipt 
of social benefits, and in strikes of professional and white-collar 
categories to widen income differentials.
According to Wilensky the new social tensions created by the welfare 
state will not be equally strong in all societal contexts. Inter­
vening variables will determine to what degree they become a 
focus of political clashes. Thus, a system of taxation which is 
only lowly visible, relying mostly on indirect taxes and social 
security contributions,will give less rise to an organized tax/welfare 
backlash than a system ^hich heavily rests on progressive direct 
taxation. A strongly organized working class with historical 
linkages to the welfare programmes will be a stronghold of pro­
welfare state ideologies. Where private or occupational welfare 
schemes are limited, the basis for successful anti-welfare state 
campaigns will remain weak, because functional alternatives to 
state schemes are in short supply. Wilensky has not only formulated 
several such hypotheses but has also subjected some of them to 
first empirical tests (cf Wilensky 1976, 1981).
The German sociologist Rainer M. Lepsius (1979) has attempted to integrate 
ideas about new cleavages structured by the welfare state into the 
Weberian theory of social classes. According to Lepsius property 
and acquisition classes are increasingly losing their former 
dominance for the structuration of social cleavages. With the 
decline of self-employment property classes have continuously lost 
social significance. Only for a very small proportion of the
population property has remained the major determinant of the 




























































































production of income for the maintenance of their social status.
Within the acquisition classes recruitment to the privileged upper 
fifth and the underprivileged lower fifth increasingly becomes 
structurally heterogeneous. The bulk of the economically active 
population belongs to the middle mass of employed persons whose 
incomes are determined by collective agreements which also guarantee 
a relative security of employment. In this situation, dependence 
on market forces is no longer class-specific but conditioned by 
sectoral and cyclical changes on markets. Distributional conflicts 
between acquisition classes therefore lose their former significance 
and give way to tensions generated by sectoral disequilibria, business 
cycles and unbalanced developments of the educational and the 
occupational systems. At the same time the growth of the welfare 
state creates a new dimension for the distribution of life-chances 
and the formation of interest groups. Positions in the societal 
reward structure therefore become a complex function of market 
relations, bargaining processes and political-administrative 
decisions.
The increasing importance of politically allocated transfers and 
goods provides at least two foci for a new mode of social structuration 
along differentiations created by the state. First, access to public 
benefits is not distributed equally. The provision of public goods 
shows regional distortions, and entitlements to transfers may be 
institutionally limited to specific groups. If access is defined 
with reference to income-limits, the differentiation merely reflects 
the divisions between the acquisition classes, but there are also 
independent forms of discrimination. Thus, in the German pension 
system economically active women must contribute to the insurance 
scheme, but they are rarely qualified for the receipt of benefits, 
because they usually do not work long enough to fulfill the legal 
qualification period of 15 years. Second, there are differences in 
the size of transfer incomes which may lead to systematic disparities 
between contributions and rewards for specific groups. Thus, in 
the German system the benefits for civil servants are higher than 
those for other groups, although members of the civil service do 
not have to pay social security contributions. Where demographic 
changes in the strength of age cohorts and protracted business cycles 




























































































pension entitlements such disparities may create a cleavage between 
the economically active and the retired population.
Lepsius does not specify whether he expects the social differentiations 
created by the public transfer system to become dominant cleavages, 
but merely maintains that the relationship between positions in the 
social structure and the formation of conflict groups is becoming 
much more complex. Which type of cleavage gains predominance for 
the formation of interest groups and the structuration of conflicts 
will also depend on the organizational and institutional mediation 
of interests, and the differential access which the various categories 
find to the collective bargaining process and the system of political 
decision making.
The optimistic assumption of the 1960s that the welfare state will
provide the key to a successful pacification of social conflicts has
thus generally given way to an awareness of new tensions which are
created by the very growth of social services and bring about new
problems of adaptation. However, the different authors we have
discussed offer varying outlooks and suggest different topics for
empirical research. Wilensky, and to some degree also Offe, stress
the cleavage between welfare recipients and the economically active
tax payers. They seem to suggest that the receipt of politically
allocated benefits constitutes a specific situs which differentiates
the welfare clients sharply from groups who draw incomes in the
market sector. In this perspective the traditional processes of
horizontal group formation and vertical conflicts between privileged
and underprivileged classes may eventually be superseded by processes
of vertical interest formation and horizontal conflicts between
4groups in the market and the welfare sector.
Whereas Offe concentrates on the distribution of public goods and 
relates the social differentiations to group-specific variations 
in conflict potentials and the relevance to the legitimization of 
authority, Wilensky focusses on the system of cash transfers and 
relates cleavages to the disparity between contributions and rewards. 
His main interest lies in the financing of the schemes and the 
degree to which different modes of financing promote the mobilization 




























































































Lepsius, finally, draws attention to inequalities within the clientele 
of the welfare state. In this perspective, the welfare system does 
not constitute one largely homogeneous sector, but a new principle 
of class structuration which itself creates new privileged and 
underprivileged (transfer) classes. Although he is aware of dispari­
ties between contributions and benefits, his focus is on inequalities 
of entitlements to transfers and on the degree to which different 
entitlements are linked to positions in the market sphere. In his 
perspective, it would appear, horizontal processes of group formation 
based on old (acquisition) or new (transfer) classes are more 
relevant for the structuration of societal cleavages than vertical 
aggregations of groups in the welfare and the market sector.
These different theoretical outlooks suggest a variety of topics 
for closer empirical analysis. To judge the fruitfulness of their 
concepts the following questions about any national welfare state 
should be raised:
- What is the relative strength of groups living from welfare 
benefits and of groups relying on market incomes?
- Are there structural bases for a welfare backlash among the 
economically active population?
- Are there indications of a formation of interest groups which give 
expression to pro- or anti-welfare state ideologies?
- To what extent are welfare recipients a homogeneous social category 
or structured into privileged and underprivileged groups?
- What are the dimensions of inequality among welfare clients?
- How is the access to welfare benefits defined, what groups are 
systematically barred from the receipt of benefits?
- How are different entitlements related to positions in the market 
sphere or to differences in the bargaining power or the potential 
for political organization and representation?
In the following empirical part of the paper we well attempt to 
clarify some of these questions with respect to the West German 
welfare state. For most problems the material at hand unfortunately 
offers only very cursory information. First, we will trace the growth 
of the welfare clientele in relation to economically active categories. 
Then some first information on the potential structural bases for 
a welfare backlash shall be presented. Finally, we will try to shed 
some light on the internal differentiations of the welfare recipients 




























































































of their respective benefits. On the basis of this information 
we will then try to evaluate to what extent cleavages based on 
the transfer system are likely to become a dominant mode of 
structuration in German society. For reasons of data availability 
all empirical information will be confined to the system of 
transfer payments excluding the civil service and also excluding 
the distribution of public goods and services.
II Empirical evidence on transfer classes in West German society
A The changing relationship between welfare recipients and 
economically active categories
An attempt to document the growth of welfare recipients in West
German society is somewhat limited by the poor quality of official
statistics on the transfer systems. Data on the various schemes
refer to cases rather than to persons and do therefore not allow
to sort out persons who receive several benefits at a time. However,
since 1960 the annual microcensus carried out by the central
statistical office allows an approximate assessment of the number
of persons relying on social transfers as their main source of 
5income.
In 1960 7.2 million citizens drew the dominant part of their incomes 
from the public transfer system. In 1974 their number surpassed 
10 million for the first time, in 1980 it almost reached 12 million. 
The deep-reaching transformation of social structure brought about 
by this growth becomes fully apparent if we draw a comparison with
gthe development of other social categories (cf figure 1). Up to 
the 1960s West Germany was predominantly a workers' society. The 
more than 13 million workers not only outnumbered all other economi­
cally active categories taken together, but boasted almost twice 
the numerical strength of welfare recipients. In 1960 the blue 
collar workers lost their absolute majority in the labour force.
In 1976 their number fell below that of white collar employees 
(including civil servants). In the 1980s they were finally even 
surpassed by welfare recipients. As figure 1 shows, employers and 
workers, the two groups whose conflicts have for more than a 
century dominated the development of industrial society, have been 
in continuous decline, while two dynamic categories have been growing 
at an almost identical pace: highly trained white collar employees 




















































































































































































































































































chances are determined by political processes.
The growing numerical strength of welfare recipients makes them 
a decisive political force. In 1961 the welfare clients accounted 
for 19 % of the electorate. A decade later (1972) their proportion 
had climbed to 23 %, by 1980 it had already reached 27 %. As the 
only social category besides members of the civil service whose 
life-chances depend directly upon the state, the welfare recipients 
have an immediate interest in the political process which should 
facilitate their electoral mobilization. Elderly pensioners 
as the largest group within the welfare clientele liave, in fact, 
always had high voter turnouts of 85 % or more (cf Sehringer 1977) .
The growing number of welfare recipients weighs heavily on the 
shoulders of the economically active population whose burden of 
taxation has been constantly growing. As figure 2 shows,contributions 
to the social insurance systems have risen from 10 % in 1950 to 
16.2% in 1980 with a marked acceleration of increases in the 
1970s (the figures refer to the employed persons' share only).
In the same period the total burden of direct taxation has also 
increased at an accelerating speed from 12.5% to almost 30 %.^
The constant rise of real incomes in the past decades helped to 
make the tightening grip of the fiscal state tolerable, but in 
the context of declining real incomes the state's squeeze may well 
be perceived as suffocating and give rise to revolts against the 
heavy burden of taxation.
However, the economically active population not only pays the bill 
for the social services, but also has a firm standing in the 
distributive system of public transfers. Only the minor programmes 
of the German welfare state provide for a highly selective accessgwhich excludes the middle mass of income earners. In the social 
insurance schemes which represent the institutional and financial 
core of the German welfare state, access has been continuously 
widened. As figure 3 shows, the percentage of the labour force 
incorporated into the social insurance programmes has risen 
considerably since the 1950s. Today about four fifths of the 
economically active population are covered against each of the 
major risks of income loss. Civil servants are protected under 
special programmes.
In West Germany, it appears, the middle mass of income earners is 








































































































































































































































original limitation of the social insurance programmes to blue
collar workers has successively given way to extensions upwards
9the social structure. Today most white collar employees are 
affiliated to the systems. This is demonstrated by figure 4 which 
shows the development of the income-limits for the compulsory 
coverage of employees in the major social insurance schemes since 
1950. Although the failure to adapt the income-limits to changing 
wage levels has occasionally driven the better earning groups 
out of the systems (especially between 1957 and 1964), average 
earners have always been incorporated. In 1968 the income-limits 
for pension and unempl oyment insurance were abolished. The limit 
for sickness insurance was indexed to changes in the wage level 
in 1970. Today only the privileged better off find themselves 
barred from the public insurance schemes which still exclude most of 
the self-employed.
The structural bases for a welfare backlash among the economically 
active population thus do not appear as very strong. The interest 
structures of the middle mass of income earners seem to be 
ambivalent with respect to the welfare state. On the one hand 
they suffer from rising contribution rates, but on the other they 
also benefit from improving benefits. As a careful analysis of 
the incidence of public transfers has shown, positive and negative 
transfers accrue to a large extent in identical households, 
especially in the middle income categories (Krupp 1978).
The formation of interest groups is not only a function of structural 
conditions,however. To a large extent it will depend upon how the 
leadership of already existing organizations perceive and define 
the situation. In this context, it is important to note that the 
German trade union movement has strong historical linkages with the 
welfare state. The social insurance programmes are managed by 
autonomous boards which are comprised of representatives of 
employees and employers. In the early yeais of the German insurance system,the 
administrative positions in the social insurance programmes 
(especially sickness insurance) provided a major channel of social 
mobility for members of the working class and the trade unions (cf 
Tennstedt 1976, Standfest 1977). Consequently, the unions 
have always acted as advocates of the social programmes. In the 



























































































preservation and even the further expansion of the welfare schemes 
for which they have demanded an increase of the state share in 
financing. Rather than making itself the spokesmen of a tax/welfare 
backlash the central interest group of the middle mass in West 
Germany thus advocates an increase in visible taxes for social 
programmes (cf Kramer 1981).10
A clash between the interest of welfare recipients and the 
economically active tax payers is also made rather unlikely by 
some of the institutional properties of the German welfare state.
Most of the programmes in fact establish a firm linkage between 
the entitlements to transfers and the income from work. Preservation 
of the social status obtained in the market sphere may be seen 
as one of the central objectives of German social policies. This 
will become more evident if we examine more specifically who the 
welfare clients are and what benefits they receive.
B The internal differentiation of the welfare clientele
1. Social positions in the welfare class I: Who the welfare recipients are
So far we have spoken of welfare recipients as though they were a
solid social category consisting of uniform elements with similar
interests. However, they draw benefits from different social
programmes which do not provide for identical entitlements. Table 1
shows the number of beneficiaries under the most important transfer
schemes from 1950 to 1979. In addition it reports eligibility ratios
which show what percentage of persons exposed to a given risk
actually receives benefits. Contrary to the figures on coverage
already reported, these ratios demonstrate real rather than potential 11entitlements and keep the effect which an expansion of risks has 
on the number of recipients constant. Thus they show which impact 
legal extensions of entitlements had on the growth of beneficiaries 
independent of demographic or socio-economic changes. Unfortunately 
meaningful eligibility ratios could only be calculated for old age
1 2pensions, unemployment benefits, and education and child allowances.
Figure 5 depicts the growth of various client groups on an annual





























































































Table 1 The Clienteles of the Major Welfare Schemes
Pensions1)
1950 1955 i960 1965 1970 1975 1979
Old age pensions
in thousands )
as *  of population 60+ 2786
Invalidity pensions \
in thousands $ . $
as *  of population 60+
Survivors'pensions J
in thousands 25*t7
as *  of population 60+ 38.$
2)
Occupational Injuries
Pensioners in thousands 536
as % of labour force 2. $
2901 36$ $85 5703 6250
3661 32.$ 3$5* 39.$ $ . $ 53.0*
$ . $ 1628 1595 1657 1822 20*t6
18.39& 15.$ 1*t.$ 1*1.7* 17.$
3285 3*i*i7 3597 3969 $ 1*t $82
*i*t.$ 38.$ 3*t.$ 3 $ $ 3 $ $ 38.$
830 916 1011 1013 1018 1013
3.5$ 3.535 3 .$ 3 .$ 3 .$ 3 .$
Sickness3)
Recipients of cash benefits 
in thousands
as *  of compulsorily insured
Unemployment*0
Recipients of cash benefits 
in thousands 
as *  of unemployed
Social Assistance^
$ 8 655 902 850 999 985 1107
3.6* *t.$ 5 .$ $ $ 5.6* 5 .$ 5.7*
1$5 889 226 109 113 817 582
77.$ 82.$ 83.$ 7 $ $ 75.$ 76.$ 66. $
Recipients of ordinary benefits 
in thousands
as % of total population 
Recipients of ordinary or special benefits
in thousands 1628
as l  of total population 3. $
Education Allowances
Aided students in thousands 
as *  of a ll students 
Aided pupils in thousands
as *  of secondary level pupils
Child Allowances
Supported families in thousands
as *  of families with children under 18 
Supported children in thousands 
as *  of all children under 18
Housing Allowances
Households receiving benefits 
in thousands 
as *  of all households
Welfare recipients '
in thousands
as % of all income receivers
760 7 $ 1190 1311
1 . $ 1 .2* 1 . $ 2. $
1328 113*1 1*t0*t 1 $ 1 2$ 9 2095
2.6* 2. $ 2. $ 2. $ 3 .$ 3 .$
1.5 32 $ 2006^ 3$ 323
1 1 . $ 12 . $ 33.$
1606'
$ . $ 32.$
583 320 $ 9
8. $ 1.7* 29.6* 27.$
2171 2113 7253 7121
27.$ 2*t.$ 82.6* 8*t.7*
$27 5176 $027 13017
30.$ 31.$ 87.$ 90.$
395 908 1666 1518
1 . $ b.r/o 7 .$ 6. $




2 1. $ 22. $ 25.$ 28.$ 28.$






















































































































































































Pen sioners are by far the largest group among the welfare clients.
In 1979 almost 13 million pensions were paid. Among these, old age
pensions are not only the largest but also the most rapidly increasing
category, which has more than doubled since 1960. This increase is
not merely a function of demographic changes: In 1960 only about
one third of the population above 60 drew an old age pension , but
1 4in 1979 more than half of them received benefits. Invalidity and 
survivors' pensions have also been growing considerably since 1950, 
but their increase was less steep. In 1979 4.6 million survivors' 
pensions and 2 million invalidity pensions were paid.
Since the generalization of the child allowance scheme in 1974,
families receiving child allowances are the second largest group
among welfare clients. More than seven million families, or 85 %
of all families with children under 18, have been receiving benefits
since then. Four other categories of welfare recipients number
more than one million each. Over two million persons, or some 3 %
of the population, received social assistance payments in 1979.
After a decline in recipients in the 1950s and fluctuations around
a fairly constant level of 1.5 million throughout the 1960s, numbers
rose again in the 1970s, especially after the economic recession
of 1974. The recession years 1966/67 and 1973-75 each saw overpro-
1 5portional annual increases of assistance recipients. About 
1.5 million households ( 6 % of all households ) are in receipt 
of housing allowances. Since the introduction of regular benefits 
in 1965 their absolute number and their proportion of the population 
have quadrupled.
Some one million persons draw sickness cash benefits. The proportion 
of compulsorily insured persons reported sick has been increasing 
continuously in the post war period. Averaging 4 % in the 1950s, 
it rose to 4.4 % in the 1960s and 5.5 % in the 1970s. Another 
million people draw a pension from the occupational injuries insurance 
scheme. After a continuous increase throughout the 1950s and the first 
half of the 1960s, their number has remained fairly constant since 
1965.16
In the two remaining categories, the number of beneficiaries is much 
more limited. The number of persons maintained on unemployment 
benefits (insurance or assistance) closely correlates to 
fluctuations in the business cycle. It is remarkable, however, that 
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been sharply declining since 1975. After fluctuations around 75 % 
between 1 950 and the mid-*9703, with occasional extensions even 
above 80 %, the eligibility ratio has gone drastically down to 
a low of 66 % in 1979. This corresponded to 582 000 beneficiaries.
The several hundred thousand unemployed persons who remain without 
compensation have either exhausted their insurance entitlements or 
have not contributed long enough to fulfill the qualification 
period for the receipt of benefits. Their weak position in the 
transfer system is a reflection of their underprivileged
situation in the labour market with frequent interruptions of 
employment. In combination with the bottom groups of the economically 
active population they could become susceptible to radical
propaganda against the existing order.
In the education allowance scheme benefits are granted independent 
of previous contributions. Nevertheless, following heavy increases 
during the phase of educational expansion , the number of pupils 
and students in receipt of allowances has also been declining in 
relative importance since 1975. In 1978 about one third of all 
students or 300 000 persons drew benefits, as opposed to 41 % in 
1975. Though continuing to rise in absolute terms to about 
400 000 persons, the proportion of pupils of secondary stage II 
receiving benefits has in the same period gone down from 3o to 27 %.
The growing numbers of beneficiaries in most programmes underline
the increasing importance of income which is allocated by political
meachanisms. However, figures on the mere size of the various client
groups can tell little about the structuration of interests. Although
all recipients of transfers must be interested to preserve at
least the purchasing power of the public payments, the benefits do
not have the same central significance for all groups. In the four
first named programmes of table 1 (pensions, occupational injuries,
sickness, and unemployment insurance) the transfers serve as income
1 7replacements which compensate the loss of earnings from work.
In the remaining four programmes the benefits function merely as 
income supplements which are designed to augment earnings from work 
(child allowances) or to cover the difference between private means 
and standards of living defined as suitable by the lawmaker ( social 




























































































Where benefits are only one source of income among others they 
appear unlikely to become a durable basis for the formation of 
interests. Moreover, for most beneficiaries including those who 
depend on a replacement of earnings from work, the receipt of 
public transfers is only a transitory experience based on the 
occurrence of specific circumstances to which there is no 
structurally patterned recruitment. Only for old age pensioners 
and parts of the recipients of social assistance, invalidity and 
survivors' pensions, the welfare state functions as the central 
determinant of life chances. Since for the members of the pension 
system transfer entitlements are largely based on the former position 
in the market sector (as we will see in more detail below), an 
aggregation of their interests with those of the acquisition 
classes presently seems more likely than their fusion with 
assistance recipients into a new interest group of welfare clients.
If the structural prospects for the formation of an embracive 
collectivity of welfare recipients appear limited, it is also 
unlikely that their alimentation by the state will make them a 
common target of a general welfare backlash. In the schemes which 
replace lost earnings, merit rather than need is the basis of 
entitlements. Only those acquire a right to the receipt of 
benefits who have contributed to the schemes on a sufficiently 
regular basis. Entitlements are therefore likely to be perceived 
as "deserved" and to incite little hostility among tax payers.
Since family allowances are universal they are also unlikely to 
become the target of a welfare backlash.
In the three remaining schemes entitlements to benefits are based
on need rather than on merit. These programmes may therefore
become a focus of attempts to curtail welfare activities. Access
to educational allowances is limited to groups below an income-limit.
Since this limit is rather high, however, extending close to the
1 8average income brackets, the middle mass whose children draw 
benefits from the scheme will probably not support cuts of the 
programme. The housing allowance scheme and the social assistance 
system appear more likely to become the target of assaults. Both 
programmes are financed out of general taxation, but entitlements 





























































































In summary, persons in receipt of social transfers form a rather 
heterogeneous social category. Not for all of them do public 
benefits have the same significance as a determinant of life 
chances. Entitlements are in some cases based on merit, in others 
on need. Only systems based on need which bar those who finance 
them from access to benefits seem likely to incite a backlash.
The beneficiaries in the major programmes for whom transfers 
represent the main source of income have strong linkages with 
the labour market. Many of them draw benefits only on a transitory 
basis (sickness, unemployment). The solid block of welfare clients 
whose life chances fully depend on the transfer system - old age 
and invalidity pensioners with full incapacity - have earned their 
entitlements through previous contributions. For them the position 
in the transfer system to a large extent reflects the prior position 
in the labour market.
The institutional linkages between the welfare schemes and the 
market sector will be documented more systematically in the next 
section which will examine to what extent the standards of living 
of welfare recipients have kept pace with that of the economically 
active population, how the generosity of benefits varies among 
different schemes, and whether differences in the levels of benefits 
may be related to variations in the bargaining power of the various client groups, or to 
the institutional linkages between the systems and the work sphere.
2. Social positions in the welfare class II: What welfare recipients get
Reliable information about the social conditions of welfare recipients 
is in short supply. Although the German microcensus allows to 
discern the size of transfers received by individual households, it 
does not render it possible to determine from which schemes these 
transfers are drawn and to what extent they are cumulated. The 
institutional data of the single programmes, on the other hand, 
deal with cases rather than persons and also leave open to what 
extent benefits are supplemented by those of other schemes. Here 
we have to settle with some very crude (yet new) information on the 
generosity of benefits in the major transfer schemes. Table 2 shows 
the size of the average (per capita) benefits of the programmes 
at constant (1976) prices and expresses them as a percentage of 
average net earnings. Figure 6 shows the development of the 
relationship between per capita benefits and wages on a yearly basis. 






























































































Average Benefits at' the jAaJor Welfare Schemes
1950 IQ C X I960 1965 1970 1975 1979
„ . ? )
Pensions
Average pension (old age or invalidity)
at constant prices (1976) 154 215 353 426 569 738 753 0
as 2 of average net earnings 322 
Average old age pension (age 65)
333» A 63» 432 432 542 502
at constant prices (1976) 390 472 633 302 776
as 2 of average net earnings 522 L  not*  C h 7 % 582 522
Average widows'/widowers' pension
at constant prices (1976) 89 130 243 312 436 565 613
as 2 of average net earnings 10»
Occuoational In iuries^
Average benefits at 1976 prices 
as 2 of averaae earnings 
A)
Unemployment
2C% 322 3" 2 362 422 A12
Average benefits at 1976 prices 197 325 452 527 790 955 955^
as 2 of average earnings 392 
Social Assistance^
515» 352 532 662 O^/o
Average benefits
at constant prices (1976) 143 183 2 2 1 226
as 2 of average net earnings 142 "52 162 152
Average benefits (  or special)
at constant prices (1976) 115 154 216 196 2 6 0 337 437
as 2 of average net earnings 242 282 2C2 2 2 2 262 292
Education
Average benefits for students
429c)at constant prices (1976) 185 209 346 421
as 2 of average net earnings 293» 272 292
Average benefits for pupils 
at constant prices (1976) 69 B p A c 7 )
as 2 of average net earnings nqfi f i 192 172
Child Allowances
Average benefits oer family
at constant prices (1976) 150 157 172 178
as % of average net earnings 152 A T P fy f i 132 122
Housina Allowances
Average benefits per household
at constant prices (1976) 49 34 87 92
3S 2 of average net earnings r *Z<<> -tV: /O -/O £?/2/0
1) In general, average benefits are benefits per capita obtained by simpiy dividing the aggregate expenditure
by the number of beneficiaries. They are given in DM at constant prices, i.a. or ices of 1976. Peree.ntages
are calculated on the basis of current figures. All figures are monthly rates.
2) All figures are averages of the workers', employees' and miners' schemes. They have been obtained by takin
the average benefits for each scheme from official sources and weighing them by the number of benetic ian s
of the respective scheme. They always refer to the e 
3)
A) Insurance benefits only, i.e. excluding unemployment
id of the stated year •
a ssista le ; incl uding :cntricuticns to ether social
insurance schemes. 1960=1961;

























































































































































































Table 3 Standard Benefits and Earnings Replacement Ratios
1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1979
Pensions (Old Aqe)
1)Standard earninas replacement ratio 67.5% 67.5% 67.5% 67.5% 67.5%
Standard pension^)
at constant prices (1976) 513 642 812 970 1075
as % of average net earnings 67% 64% 68% 74% 72%
Sickness
Earnings replacement ratio^ 50% 50% 90% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Unemployment
Earnings replacement ratio 45% 55% 55% 62.5% 68% 68%
Social Assistance
Regular benefits^
at constant prices (1976) 151 185 217 266 277
as % of average net earnings 20% 19% 18% 19% 20%
Child Allowances
Standard benefits for
1st child: at current prices 50 50
at constant prices (1976) 52 45
as % of av. net earnings 4% 3%
2nd child: at current prices 25 25 70 100
at constant prices (1976) 39 35 73 91
as % of av. net earnings 3% 5% 6%
3rd child, at current prices 25 40 50 60 120 200
at constant prices (1976) 49 72 78 84 125 181
as % of av. net earnings 8% 9% 8% 7% 9% 12%
1) Earnings replacement ratio, according to pension formula for a beneficiary with 45
contribution years and life  time earnings corresponding to average earnings of the insured population.
2) Actual pension drawn by a pensioner fu lfilling  the conditions of note 1.
3) Legal earnings replacement ratio during the first six weeks of illness.
4) Since 1975 legal earnings replacement ratio; in previous years earnings replacement ratio obtained by a 
single beneficiary with average earnings.
5) Rates to which single persons below 65 are entitled if  without other income; persons above 65 get 30% more 
(until 1964: 20% more).
6) Since 1975 rates for 3rd and'further children; between 1964 and 1974 benefits for the fourth and for the 
fifth and further children had special higher rates.
Notes to table 1
1) The data refer to the number of pensions paid under the workers', employees' and miners' scheme. One person 
may draw several pensions.
2) Total yearly pensions (incl. survivors’ pensions)
3) The data refer to the number of sick persons within the compulsorily insured population. Absolute numbers are 
based on percentages reported in official sources. About 99 per cent of all compulsory members are entitled 
to cash benefits in the form of wage continuation.
4) Number of persons drawing unemployment insurance benefits or unemployment assistance benefits.
5) Regular benefits: Hilfe zum Lebensunterhalt
6) 1971
7) 1978
8) The data refer to persons relying on pensions or similar payments as their dominant source of income. It  




























































































Table 2 and figure 6 demonstrate that welfare recipients have
usually been able to keep pace with the living standard of the
economically active population. The beneficiaries of the income
replacement schemes have even sizeably improved their relative
positions over time. In the income supplement programmes the
average payments of the social assistance scheme (regular benefits)
and of the housing allowance programme preserved a constant
1 9relationship to average earnings. Only child and education 
allowances have somewhat declined in relative terms. For the 
bulk of welfare clients the gap between income from work and 
income from the transfer system has thus rather been narrowed 
than widened.
To make welfare recipients participate in the increasing prosperity 
of the economy has always been an explicit policy goal of 
German governments (cf von Beyme 1979). Various institutional 
linkages tie transfers to earnings from work. Entitlements in 
the income replacement schemes are all expressed as percentages 
of lost earnings. Rising wages are therefore immediately trans­
mitted into the system of transfers. In addition, the earnings- 
replacanent ratios of all schemes have been consistently augmented 
in the post war period (cf table 3). Long-term benefits which 
are drawn for extended duration are either indexed to changes 
in wages or successively adapted to the development of economic 
conditions.
The indexation of benefits first came about in pension insurance 
when the reform of 1957 provided for annual increases of 
pensions according to changes in the wage level ( with a time lag). 
Pensions under the industrial accident insurance scheme were 
indexed in 1964. If sickness and unemployment benefits are drawn 
longer than a year they are augmented at the same rate as 
pensions (since 1975]. Although they are not indexed, benefits of 
the income supplement schemes are repeatedly adapted to changing 
economic conditions. Thus, the standard rates of the social 
assistance scheme have been revised annually since 1957. Education 
allowances are subjected to a bi-annual re-examination since 1974. 
Housing allowances are adapted to changing incomes and rent levels 
since 1978. Child allowances are the only benefit which is neither 





























































































These institutional mechanisms have successfully safeguarded 
benefits against setbacks in purchasing power. In all schemes 
per capita benefits have multiplied in real terms over the last 
decades (cf table 1). The degree of generosity, however, varies 
considerably among different programmes. This is shown in table 1 
for average benefits and in table 3 for the legally established 
rates. As the per capita benefits are a function of a diversity 
of factors such as changing distributions of contribution and 
earnings records among the beneficiaries, inequalities among 
various client groups which are shaped by the political process 
are better reflected in table 3.
By their very nature the income replacement systans provide for
much higher benefits than the income supplement schemes. However,
also within the group of income replacement programmes the
generosity of benefits varies widely. Sickness cash benefits fully
compensate lost earnings for a period of six weeks. After this
they amount to 80 % of gross earnings with previous net earnings
as a possible maximum. In the 1950s they had only replaced 50 %
of lost earnings. Unemployment insurance benefits increased from
an original 45 % to a present 68 % of lost net earnings. The
legal rates in the pension insurance schemes have remained
unchanged since 1957. In the standard case of an average earner
with a contribution record of 45 years, old age pensions amount
20to 67.5 of (recent) average wages. Invalidity and widows'
pensions are lower, in standard cases amounting to 52.5 and 21 %
21of average wages respectively. The invalidity pensions of the 
occupational injuries insurance scheme are much more generous.
In the case of permanent incapacity they amount to two thirds of 
lost gross wages which in most cases corresponds to the continuation 
of net earnings.
As sickness and unemployment benefits provide for short-term income 
loss, pensions of the pension insurance and the occupational 
injuries programme for long-term risks, differences in the generosity 
of the benefits between these two groups could be related to 
functional considerations of the varying costliness of the pro­
grammes. The differences within the groups of short-term and long­
term benefits do not lend themselves to such an explanation, however. 
They are neither based on differentials in the market sphere, nor 




























































































the income loss. The differences in evaluation can hardly be 
related to the differential bargaining power of various pressure 
groups, because the beneficiaries of all these schemes are equally 
recruited from the economically active population. The difference 
between sickness and unemployment benefits presumably reflects the 
attempt to keep the incentive to work among the unemployed popula­
tion high, but they may also echo cultural values which equate 
unemployment with idleness. The difference between invalidity 
pensions in the occupational injuries and the pension insurance 
systems reflects the longevity of the originally institutionalized 
principle of German social policies to make the causes rather than 
the extent of indigence the reference point of administrative action
The various income supplement schemes also provide for discrepant 
levels of benefits. Per capita transfers are highest in the educatio 
nal allowance scheme for students. The public grants to university 
students amounted to almost one third of average net wages in 
recent years. Although they have not been growing with the same 
dynamism as the other expenditure categories, education allowances 
thus are on a remarkably high level when compared with other trans­
fers. In the early 1950s the per capita benefits for talented
university students ("Honnefer Modell") were higher than the
2 2average pension in the workers' scheme. In the 1970s the per 
capita education allowance including pupils of the secondary 
sector was higher than the regular benefit granted to social 
assistance recipients ( who additionally receive benefits to cover 
the cost of housing, however).
The relatively privileged position of beneficiaries of the education 
allowance programme may probably be explained by the strategic 
political position of their middle mass parents. However, the gap 
between benefits of the education allowance and the assistance 
scheme has narrowed rather than widened over time. The fact that even 
the legal rates of the social assistance programme and the average 
housing allowance have grown at the same pace as wages is not 
easily explained by political economy models. Both groups have little 
collective bargaining power and lack political representation.
Since their programmes are financed out of general taxation but 
are highly selective,we also considered them the prime candidates 




























































































social assistance scheme has maintained a fairly stable relation­
ship to average net earnings of 20 %, while per capita housing 
allowances kept constant at a level of 6 %.
The participation of all welfare recipients in the general 
upgrading of the standard of living was certainly facilitated by 
the high economic growth rates of the post war decades which allowed 
to expand social policies on the basis of more to everyone. In a 
protracted period of austerity conscious choices about the distri­
bution of resources and cuts will probably play a more prominent
role. In this situation the weak strategic position of asssistance
23recipients may come stronger to the fore.
Differences of welfare entitlements within single programmes
are only poorly documented in official statistics. However, such
differences are almost entirely a function of the positions which
the beneficiaries held in the market sector. The earnings-replace-
ment ratios of the insurance systems directly transmit the status
in the labour market into the system of transfers. In the income
supplement schemes the relationship between market and transfer
income is reversed. Entitlements are highest for the lowest earning
groups, while the better off get progressively less. The tight
linkage between transfer and market incomes has been loosened
to a certain extent only in pension insurance, where entitlements
based on merit have successively been complemented by entitlements
based on need. Thus, for low-earning groups a minimum pension
24component was introduced. As a consequence the trend towards
an increasing difference between the average pension of employees
25and that of workers, which had set in in 1 957, was reversed.
The global structure of disparities based on imbalances between 
the contributions paid and the transfers received is hardly explored. 
It has already been indicated that positive and negative transfers 
appear to incur largely in the same households. Even the lowest 
income groups pay considerable taxes and social security contri­
butions, and even the higher earning groups receive public trans­
fers (cf Krupp 1978) . The proportion of households who receive 
higher transfers than they pay is, however, greatest in the lowest 
income groups. In this sense, the West German welfare state is 
redistributive despite its intitutional orientation towards the 




























































































is in itself redistributive in the sense that it reduces the 
inequality in the distribution of the (in-)security of social 
status. Whether disparities in the incidence of positive and 
negative transfers can provide a structural basis for processes 
of group formation appears doubtful. Since even social science 
experts have difficulties to detect them, it seems unlikely that 
they will become visible enough to serve as a foundation for 
collective action.
In summary, then, the standard of living of welfare recipients 
has not fallen behind that of other groups. The purchasing power 
offer capita social transfers multiplied in the post war period.
The relationship between transfers and wages either remained 
constant or shifted in favour of the clients of the welfare 
schemes. Although all welfare recipients participated in ‘the 
rising prosperity of the post war years, they are not all 
entitled to equally generous benefits. Levels of benefit vary 
between different schemes and within single programmes. Differences 
between the generosity of various systems do not seem related to 
the bargaining power of their clientele or to the extent to which 
the institutional structure of the programmes gives rise to a 
welfare backlash. Rather they reflect the longevity of the old 
principle of German social policies to make the generosity of 
transfers contingent upon the causes rather than the extent of 
need situations. Differences in entitlements within single pro­
grammes merely reflect and prolong inequalities in the market 
sphere. In this sense they underline rather than counteract the 
importance of acquisition classes for the structuration of interests. 
In the following section, we will attempt to put these results into 
the context of the general perspectives on the impact of the welfare 




























































































III Summary, conclusions, and perspectives
The number of persons living from benefits of the social transfer 
system has been rapidly increasing in West Germany during the last 
decades. The growing importance of transfers allocated by political 
mechanisms has reduced the significance of income from the market 
sphere as a prime determinant of life chances. Thus it has probably 
contributed to diminish the salience of traditional class conflicts. 
On the other hand, the public transfer system is also a source of 
new inequalities which may eventually become a basis for new 
social cleavages.
In the West German welfare state several reference points for 
the development of such cleavages may be discerned. The expansion 
of social programmes has led to the steepest increase in the tax 
burden since World War I. In the context of economic austerity 
a further growing tax burden may become a source of increasing 
unrest among economically active tax payers. Whereas a smooth 
functioning of the economy requires the successful integration 
of the middle mass of dependent workers, a curtailment of social 
expenditures becomes politically difficult, because persons 
living from public transfers represent a rapidly growing proportion 
of the electorate. Their common interest is to at least preserve 
the attained level of benefits. Maintaining the balance between 
the interest in lower taxes and the quest for generous social 
benefits may therefore become increasingly difficult.
Within the transfer system some new inequalities are constituted. 
Apart from the child allowance scheme none of the German social 
programmes provides for universal access. Contributions to a 
system do not necessarily establish future entitlements. In some 
schemes access to benefits is limited to groups below an income- 
limit although all taxpayers contribute to their financing. For 
those who are entitled to benefits, identical needs may be com­
pensated diversely, depending on the causes which gave rise to 
the need. These inequalities are independent of inequalities in 
the market sector. In a context of austerity, tensions between 
groups with discrepant welfare entitlements may become exacerbated.
So far none of these structural tensions has assumed a relevant 
role in the structuration of conflicts in West German society.




























































































welfare issues but on ecological questions. The new party of 
the "greens" has taken a populist stand for the defense of 
social programmes. Present quarrels about the welfare state 
to a large extent reflect the old cleavage between the political 
"left" and "right" (cf Pappi 1976). Several institutional 
properties of the German welfare state favour an aggregation of 
interests of acquisition and welfare classes. The middle mass 
of the economically active population is integrated into the 
major social programmes. Entitlements to benefits for them are 
an important economic asset. Their interest organizations have 
long established linkages with the public transfer system in 
whose autonomous administration they have been participating 
for an entire century. The trade unions have always advocated 
an expansion rather than a curtailment of social programmes.
The benefits in the major programmes aim at status preservation 
rather than at (visible) redistribution. Since they are earnings- 
related they directly transmit the social status attained in the 
market sphere into the system of public transfers. Entitlements 
are based on previous contributions and thus on merit rather than 
on need (at least in the most important programmes). They are 
therefore likely to be considered as "deserved". All this favours 
the definition of inequalities which arise in the transfer system 
as a reflection of the "basic" inequality in the market sphere 
and the consequent aggregation of welfare issues with cleavages 
based on positions in the labour market.
The differences in the generosity of benefits among various
programmes do not provide a firm basis for the formation of
interest groups. In the first instance they fragment welfare
recipients into various client groups. The receipt of benefits
in many cases is only a transitory experience. Recruitment to
the schemes which provide different benefits for identical needs
2 6is not structurally patterened but accidental. Among the 
recipients of various schemes there are no structural channels 
of contact or communication. Disparities which are not perceived 
and confirmed in regular contacts appear unlikely to serve as a 
basis for processes of group formation. The beneficiaries of 
various programmes probably do not perceive themselves a "relevant 




























































































of benefits over time will probably be of more central importance 
than differences between various schemes. So far, the benefits
of all programmes have been considerably augmented. Even the 
payments of schemes which appeared likely to incite a backlash 
and whose beneficiaries have only little bargaining power have 
kept pace with the rising standard of living among wage earners. 
There were no processes of pauperization among members of a new 
subproletariat constituted by persons on welfare. In summary, 
it appears rather unlikely that tensions or structural cleavage 
lines constituted by the transfer system will become a dominant 
mode of structuration of German society.
From the German experience we can maybe develop some more general 
hypotheses about settings of social policy which tend to impede 
group formations based on welfare classes. The potential for a 
structuration of conflicts on the basis of inequalities created 
by the welfare state seems to be low:
- where older societal cleavages have found firm organizational 
expression;
- where conflicts about the welfare state have already been 
formulated and channeled by prevailing interest groups;
- where social programmes are universal in coverage or embrace 
at least the middle mass of income earners;
- where benefits are earnings-related, thus reflecting already 
existing inequalities in the market sphere; however, a combi­
nation of earnings-related benefits with minimum standards may 
prevent a politically de-stabilizing superimposition of under­
privilege in the market and the transfer sector;
- where beneficiaries of the schemes have also contributed to 
their financing, thus nourishing the perception that entitlements 
are deserved;
- where the administration of programmes is not monopolized by the 
state,but run by partly autonomous bodies in which traditional 
interest groups are represented -possibly together with 
representatives of the beneficiaries in order to provide channels 
for the institutionalization of conflicts about transfers.
Most of these conditions prevail in West Germany. However, even in 
the German setting, three problems linked to the welfare state 




























































































demographic changes the number of pensioners, will rise much
faster than the number of economically active contributors to
pension insurance in the 1990s. This will either oblige policy
makers to raise contributions or to cut benefits. Either measure
will probably exacerbate tensions between the generations.
Discussions about curtailments through a modification of the
pension formula which has been in unmodified effect since 1957
27have already set in.
Second, the increasing de-differentiation of sex*roles is in 
tension with the legal or factual differentiation of pension 
entitlements for men and women. A reform of the discrimi­
nation of men in the survivors' pensions programme is presently 
under way. In the context of the general mobilization of women 
the enhanced attention for sex-specific entitlements will probably 
fuel demands for a lowering of the qualification period for the 
receipt of old age pensions for women, because mothers can rarely 
fulfill the prescribed contribution record of 15 years. The 
scarce resources in the already strained pension system set,however, 
tight limits to the realization of such demands.
A third potential for conflicts may arise from the combination of 
problems in the labour market, the unemployment benefit programmes, 
and the educational system. The recent years saw steep increases 
in youth unemployment. Since they never contributed to the insurance 
scheme, unemployed young persons are not entitled to benefits. At 
the same time the explosive expansion of the educational system 
has - in the context of shrinking public resources - led to 
rising unemployment among university graduates. Especially teachers 
do no longer find positions. If the present employment crisis 
persists, the combination of a growing number of young persons who 
are not integrated into systems of social control/ and intellectuals 
in search of mobility chances could become a fertile ground for 
the growth of radical political movements.
Independent of the extent to which tensions created by the welfare 
state presently give rise to interest group formations or conflicts, 
the debate on the emergence of welfare classes opens up stimulating 
theoretical prospects, because it invites us to reverse the tradi­
tional question about the social bases of politics in favour of a 
search for the political bases of social structuration. In a 




























































































of conflicts between acquisition classes was not only based on 
a specific mode of production, but also on specific institutional 
settings. Thus the gradual introduction of the freedom of 
association and of universal (manhood) suffrage equipped the 
underprivileged classes with the power resources that are 
prerequisites for effective collective action. Prior to these 
institutional changes vertical processes of interest formation 
under control of the privileged strata and horizontal conflicts 
between privileged property and privileged acquisition classes 
were more prominent. Now, after the long dominance of horizontal 
coalition formations with vertical conflicts between privileged 
and underprivileged classes, the new instititutional setting of 
associational or corporatist democracy with professional elites 
and a growing importance of state allocated transfers may eventually 
redress the pattern of coalition formation and conflicts again.
The following chart summarizes this hypothetical process in 
schematic form:
Bourgeois census democracy 
with limitaci freedom of 
association
Parliamentary democracy 
with universal suffrage and 
freecom of association
Associational democracy 
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Vertical patterns cf group 
formation ar.a horizontal 
conflicts between privi- 
legec classes 
(underprivileged classes 
without adequate ocwer 
resources r'c-r effective 
mobilization)
Horizontal patterns of group 
formation with vertical con­
flicts between privileged 
and underprivileged classes 
(mobilization of underprivi­
leged classes)
Strengthened importance of vertical patterns 
of group formation and conflicts between 
sectors with different degrees of organi­
zational power and political representation
Of course, such a "model" is highly speculative, but the extent 
to which different political or institutional settings generate 
different patterns of interest group and coalition formation 





























































































1 This refers to social security expenditure (excluding housing 
and education) according to the definition of the International 
Labour Office in the 13 major Western European democracies.For 
a systematic analysis of the post-war development of social 
security outlays in these countries see Alber 1982a.
2 For similar arguments see Touraine 1973.
3 According to Wilensky the middle mass unites the upper strata 
of the old working class (craftsmen, foremen, high-paid opera­
tives) with the lower ranks of the middle class (clerks, 
salesmen, small entrepreneurs, semi-professional and semi-technical 
people).
4 It may be noted in passing that the idea of a supersession of 
occupational "status" by sectoral "situs" identities seems to 
be pervasive in several theories of "post-industrial" or 
"late-capitalist" societies- cf Bell 1973, O'Connor 1973,
Touraine 1973.
5 The statistical category refers to persons living from pensions 
or similar sources of income. Unfortunately it includes an 
unspecified number of persons living from capital gains. Detailed 
figures for the state of Baden-Württemberg show that the 
proportion of people living from capital in the category is 
below 3 %.
6 The data for figure 1 are taken from various editions of 
"Arbeits- und Sozialstatistik- Hauptergebnisse" and -for 1980- 
from "Statistisches Jahrbuch fur die Bundesrepublik Deutschland 
1981".
7 These percentages refer to income taxes and social security 
contributions as per cent of the aggregate sum of wages.
8 This refers to social assistance, housing and education 
allowances. Together these schemes represent less than 5 %
of all direct social expenditure (excluding property formation)- 
cf "Sozialbericht 1980".
9 For a systematic description and analysis-of this process in 
a comparative perspective see Alber 1982.
10 A sounder assessment of the potential for a welfare backlash 
to find organizational expression would of course have to rely 
on an analysis of changing attitudes towards the welfare state 
in opinion polls. Unfortunately I have not yet been able to see 
recent survey results such as the analysis of Coughlin 1980.
The inconclusive evidence of some of the older surveys
is summarized in Alber 1980.
11 The coverage data show the number of persons (expressed as % of 
the labour force) who are in the process of acquring entitlements 
by paying compulsory contributions.
12 The percentages reported for the other schemes merely serve to 
put the absolute figures into a comparative perspective.
Again it must be remembered that the official statistics only 
give a somewhat distorted impression because they refer ‘to the 






























































































14 Since these figures exclude pensioners under the special
schemes for civil servants, farmers, and free professions, 
the actual percentage of old people in receipt of public 
pensions is higher. However, the reported ratios overstate the 
proportion of pensioners in the general system, because they 
refer to the number of pensions paid, and one person may draw 
several pensions. Expressed as a proportion of the population 
above age 65, the figure for 1979 would be 66 %. 65 years
is the normal age limit for the receipt of pensions in the 
German system, but for women and special groups this limit is 
actually lowered to 60. The increase in eligibility ratios in 
the 1970s reflects the introduction of the flexible age limit 
in 1972 which permitted a reduction in the retiring age from 
65 to 63 years.
15 About one third of the beneficiaries are older than 65 years, 
about one fourth are children below the age of 14.
16 These figures do not include pensions paid under the accident 
insurance scheme for students and pupils.
17 This does not fully apply to invalidity and survivors' pensions. 
Whether invalidity pensions in the occupational injuries and 
the pension insurance schemes are drawn beside or instead of 
earnings depends on the degree of incapacity.
18 The limit is defined as the sum of a general ceiling plus 
various allowances which depend on personal circumstances 
such as the number and age of children.
19 The fact that the per capita amount of all assistance benefits 
together (including the special benefits for particular 
circumstances) grew faster than average wages does not 
necessarily indicate an improved quality of benefits. Since 
entitlements are expressed as income supplements which cover 
the difference between reckonable private means and a
decent standard of living, higher relative benefits may also 
indicate that the transfers had to cover widening gaps. The 
same logic applies to changes in the other income supplement 
schemes.
20 The percentage actually refers to the proportion of the general 
computation base of the pension formula. The average old age 
pension is lower than this standard pension because many 
pensioners have only short contribution records, or life time 
earnings below the average wage. The decrease of per capita 
pensions in recent years presumably reflects the increasing 
proportion of female pensioners with low earnings and short 
contribution records. The statistically typical pension which 
the majority of male workers actually received amounted to
64 % of average net earnings in 1979.
21 Invalidity pensions vary with the degree of incapacity and the 
length of the contribution record. The cited case assumes 
full incapacity occurring below age 55 and contributions from 
the age of 20. The widow's pension rate applies if death 
occurred below age 55, contributions were paid from the age
of 20, and earnings corresponded to the average wage.
22 The average worker's pension (old age and invalidity) was
DM 89.70 in 1955, whereas the per capita benefits of students 
amounted to DM 94 according to the data published by the 





























































































23 Even groups with little organizational power may find potent 
political spokesmen, however. Thus conservative politicians 
frequently favour a stronger selectivity of social programmes 
and a higher concentration of benefits on the most needy 
especially in times of austerity.
24 The personal computation basis for the calculation of benefits 
was raised to 75 % for persons with long contribution records 
who did not reach this level.
25 The average pension for employees fluctuated around 152 % of 
the average worker's pension up to the reform of 1957. It then 
climbed to a high of 172 % in 1969, to fall again down to
152 % in 1980.
26 Thus, invalidity pensions may depend on whether a road accident 
occurred on a trip between home and working place (giving rise 
to an entitlement for occupational injuries insurance pensions) 
or on a holiday trip (constituting invalidity pension entitlements) .
27 In the case of enhanced tensions, an increase of contribution 
rates may be politically less de-stabilizing than a curtailment 
of entitlements. The future pensioners have probably built up 
stable pension expectations on the basis of the present formula 
whose long persistence they have financed with high contributions. 
Since they have been socialized in a democratic setting and 
frequently also in institutions of higher learning, they will 
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